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A few yeArs Ago at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, 
I heard an Indian jurist’s lecture on human rights. He ap-
proached the theme, unsurprisingly, from the viewpoint of 
Hindu tradition. Overall, his interest was in tying the concept 
of rights to that of obligations, and in defining dharma, a con-
cept alien to the conventions of European culture. Individual 
duty is determined in the Hindu context not by the demands 
of others, of institutions, or of immanent laws, but on the 
basis of dharma, a cosmic order in which every entity must 
take part if it is not to invalidate itself. While listening to the 
lecture, I remembered an earlier colloquium on the same 
theme, this one organized by the Arab countries. The collo-
quium ended with the assertion that one cannot speak of hu-
man rights without constantly invoking “the rights of Allah”. 
Europeans present at both lectures were clearly taken by sur-
prise and avoided any reaction. They were familiar with what 
we may call the vulgata of human rights, but they knew little 
or nothing about other civilizations and cultures. What they 
had just learned from the Indian professor did not fit with 
their accustomed concept at all. The Europeans present had 
different opinions born of a philosophy in which metaphys-
ics in the traditional sense and theology no longer have any 
weight. But their natural impulse to discuss the problem was 
hindered by several principles that in recent decades have 
come to be viewed as inviolable: respect for the right to differ-
ence, and tolerance toward other people’s opinions.
The following thoughts originate in my desire to under-
stand this suspension of dialogue and to draw attention to 
the crisis of the concept of tolerance. Tolerance has become a 
commonplace of civilized behavior and, like every common-
place, has come to be accepted blindly and indiscriminately.
It seems that, although we live in a world of globalization in 
which spatial and cultural distances are shrinking palpably, 
this does not rule out ignorance about the intellectual and so-
cial foundations of the other; on the contrary, it increases the 
irrational aspect of this ignorance. One can reach Bangkok 
relatively quickly, one can maintain political or trade rela-
tions with Bangkok, and one can do all of this without episte-
mologically leaving the picturesque scenery of the tourist’s 
world. Paradoxically, globalization is inversely proportionate 
with general knowledge. The easier it is to encounter each 
other, the less we know each other.
A second remArk is that ignorance does not preclude 
cordiality. One can have good relations with other people 
while knowing nothing about their cultural background. At 
first glance, this seems a gain for civilization: communication 
is possible even in the absence of knowledge. But can there 
be genuine communication under such conditions? Or is it 
simply “etiquette”, a pleasant surface choreography? Basi-
cally, we are experiencing a substantial change in the concept 
of “tolerance”. The term no longer denotes the acceptance of 
“being different” or holding a different opinion, but simply a 
friendly and well-intentioned ignoring of the other opinion, 12
the elimination of difference as difference. The results of this 
are (A) I need not understand you to accept you, and (B) I 
need not discuss your views with you before assuming you 
are in the right. In other words, I agree — in principle — with 
what I don’t understand, and I agree in principle with what 
I may not agree with. You have a right to your opinion; I re-
spect your opinion. I have a right to my opinion and expect 
that it be respected. Dialectic is unnecessary. This mutual 
tolerance ends in a universal, peaceful, confidently smiling 
silence — a silence in which dialogue can only be an undesir-
able disturbance.
Under these conditions, the effects of tolerance are more 
than questionable. It curtails our pleasure in knowledge and 
in genuine understanding of difference, and it undermines 
the desire for debate. Why bother, when the result must 
consist in a mutual affirmation of each other’s right anyway? 
In a world governed by such rules, Socrates would have been 
unemployed. There is no truth to be found, and no chain of 
proof is needed. All that is asked of us is that we politely re-
spect our interlocutor’s convictions.
This unquestioned call for tolerance challenges several cat-
egories that were still operational until yesterday: error, guilt, 
the relation of norm and exception, the principles of educa-
tion, the technique of disputation, and, in general, the risky 
problem of the unacceptable and the intolerable. Tolerance 
is transformed from a pure necessity for living together well 
(“L’apanage de l’humanité”, the condition of humanity, said 
Voltaire; “To forbear each other’s foolishness is the first law of 
nature”) into a neutral disposition, a kind of logi-
cal and axiological anesthesia, the symptom of 
a cheerful inner paralysis. Being tol-
erant seems to mean giving up one’s 
sense of orientation. Please 
don’t condemn my 
concern prematurely. 
I’m not calling for 
intolerance and the 
cruelty of the 
geometrical 
mind. I do 
not want to 
re-establish 
black-and-white 
judgments, nor the 
normative sclerosis of 
dichotomies and the unre-
alistic monotony of “either/
or”. All I want to do is point 
out that there is an urgent 
necessity to add the discrim-
inative faculty to tolerance, to 
avoid confounding respect for 
difference with the dissolving 
ethic of “anything goes”.
It is generally agreed that the 
modern debate on tolerance 
begins with John Locke at the 
end of the 17th century. But in 
reality, a concept is probably 
already in crisis if it becomes 
a topic of controversy and 
one feels a need to justify 
it theoretically and assert it 
publicly. (Compare for example 
the contemporary overuse of the 
“European problem”.)
Against the backdrop of brutal conflicts between the 
various religious denominations and factions, which were 
incapable of living together, Locke suggested a philosophical 
justification of tolerance. In this context, tolerance was an 
antidote to the practice of persecution. Thus we should not 
forget that tolerance, in the European sense, was originally 
established with strictly religious connotations. (In this sense, 
incidentally, John Locke, the theoretician of tolerance and an 
outstanding proponent of the separation between civil and 
religious life, is not modern enough to accept tolerance to-
ward atheists; their lack of spiritual engagement made them 
seem to him antisocial beings.) Extrapolating it to other fields 
is a difficult endeavor requiring nuance and reformulation.
But there is a self-evident component of tolerance that is 
part of the behavioral heritage of the human species and did 
not have to wait until the beginnings of the modern age to 
find expression. I refer primarily to tolerance toward oneself, 
which I think has an ancient tradition. Man has probably be-
haved in a “Christian” manner toward himself since long be-
fore the appearance of Christianity. We know our own sins all 
too well, we know unutterable and unavowable things about 
ourselves, and we often do not approve of what we ourselves 
do. But all in all, we regard ourselves with a great deal of sym-
pathy — we understand ourselves, we endure ourselves, and 
we forgive ourselves. What prevails is the feeling that we are 
basically decent people, “good guys”, righteous persons. At 
least, we are not as bad as we would seem and, most impor-
tantly perhaps, we are not as bad as others are.
For this reason I am tempted to assert that “Love thy 
neighbor as thyself” does not mean “Love others as much 
as you love yourself”, but rather “Love others with the same 
forbearance with which you love yourself” and “Be just as 
tolerant of others’ weaknesses as you are of your own.” An 
inconsequential but telling example of the tolerance we 
have toward ourselves is the forbearance we usually exercise 
toward our own habits and idiosyncrasies. No matter how 
ridiculous or compulsive they may be, our idiosyncrasies are 
part of ourselves to such a degree that we never really con-
sider reforming them.
tolerAnce Also seems absolutely natural when we prac-
tice it toward those close to us. Love always expresses itself, 
sometimes irrationally, in tolerance: we are lenient towards 
our children, members of our family, and some friends. We 
accept slip-ups and deviations from them that would appear 
unacceptable to us in others.
Basically, life within small communities is a genuine school 
of tolerance. In larger communities, one can isolate oneself, 
creating clubs based on affinities, and thus avoid contact with 
everything disconcerting or bothersome. But in a family, one 
has to accommodate the peculiarities of each member, like 
a fate that, in the given situation, cannot be escaped. Mar-
riage, for example, demands a tolerant spirit to the point of 
sacrifice. One must come to an agreement and accustom one-
self to the way one’s spouse rolls up the toothpaste tube (or 
doesn’t), to eating habits, to rhythms and idiosyncrasies that 
are completely alien.
But tolerance is an ordinary experience even outside of 
one’s relationship to oneself or to people one is close to. In 
everyday life, what we could call the weak variant of toler-
ance, leniency, is widespread. You know that something is 
going on that is against the rules, you don’t approve of it, but 
you overlook it. You act as if you did not perceive the offense. 
For example, you know that some pupils at school smoke in 
the bathrooms during the breaks. You know that the cleaning 
woman in your office filches your bonbons, that your buddy 
smokes your cigarettes. But you decide that it is not worth 
attributing importance to such trifles. Leniency is thus the 
tendency to tolerate what appears inessential. The little sins 
that we — like everyone — commit or have committed in an-
other phase of life have to be treated with leniency, covered 
up, forgotten. Leniency is the tolerance of grandparents who 
observe — without interfering — their grandchildren’s pranks 
from the corner of their amused eyes.
Another, stronger form of tolerance is also common, if not 
banal: complicity, silent approval. You can no longer overlook 
the violation of the rule, but after pragmatic calculation you 
decide to allow it. We — at least we in Eastern Europe — know 
that “baksheesh” is a very unhealthy matter. We do not ap-
prove of it, but we practice it — whether out of weakness or 
out of strategic opportunism. We prefer to acquiesce in a 
bad habit than to accept the adverse effects of correcting it. 
It seems more profitable to stimulate prompt service or to 
reward the granting of favors than to give futile and senseless 
lessons on correctness. One lacks the courage to intervene 
with moralization, one decides, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of the lesser evil, to take part in the transgression. The 
French expression for a brothel  — maison de tolérance — is 
also to be understood in this sense (“Tolérance?” exclaimed 
a French writer, “Mais il y a des maisons pour cela!”). The civil 
decision to license a brothel, the house of tolerance, has the 
purpose of neutralizing a potential source of uncontrolled 
disorder by setting up a territory of controlled disorder, a dis-
order permitted as long as some rules are respected. In canon 
law, this is called permissio comparativa and is to be preferred 
over unconditional permission, approbatio.
finAlly, on Another level, we sometimes have to do with 
a dismal species of tolerance: resignation. One sees the viola-
tion of a rule and one rejects it internally, but one endures it 
as something unavoidable. As a rule, one chooses resigna-
tion either because one does not believe the situation can be 
changed (hence there is no sense in trying to change it), or 
because, for one reason or another, one wants to keep up ap-
pearances.
In the first case, tolerance has a tinge of discouragement and 
lies close to the boundary of cowardice. The person who is 
terrorized by a dictatorship is slow to react not because he is 
tolerant of the dictatorship, but because he is intimidated by 
its inventory of repressive methods. In the second case, toler-
ance is subsumed in the rhetoric of sanctimony and hypocrisy: 
A husband or wife who knows about his or her spouse’s be-
trayal accepts the situation in order to maintain conventions 
and thus appears to practice tolerance. But in truth he or 
she has merely resigned, for the sake of his or her own or the 
partner’s image.
The situations I have enumerated thus far prove that there 
is an atemporal practice and problem of tolerance that is in-
deed, as Voltaire said, “a condition of humanity”. Even where 
external conditions have drastically narrowed the spectrum 
of its manifestation, tolerance remains the minimum prereq-
uisite for living together, the internal hygiene of a functioning 
group. The fact that today people speak much more and more 
significantly about this topic than before indicates, not a new 
field of reflection, but rather a deviating expansion of the con-
cept, a change of context that brings its definition to the verge 
of explosion.
Before Attempting to describe this development, I would 
like to briefly systematize the cases listed above:
1. Tolerance is an epiphenomenon of communal life. At least 
two different persons are required before the problem of 
tolerance can be posed in proper terms. The psychologiza-
tion of the concept, the discourse of tolerant or intolerant 13
“dispositions”, of “mildness of temperament” (Calvin spoke 
of mansuetudo animi), and the definition of tolerance as an 
autonomous virtue, as a value “in itself”, and thus with abso-
lute legitimacy — all of these are irrelevant, inconsequential 
speculations as long as there is no opportunity for a direct 
experiment, a social test. For Robinson Crusoe, for example, 
living alone on the island, the question of tolerance does not 
arise. I mention this merely to preclude the enthusiastic (and 
utopian) chatter about tolerance in general and to discourage 
the prattle about its angelic, altruistic magnanimity. An abso-
lute “We have to be tolerant” means nothing. The problem is: 
Under what circumstances, at what moment, to what degree, 
and toward whom or what are we tolerant?
2. Tolerance is at issue only when one of two opposing 
sides can exercise power. In other words: only he who has 
the means to be intolerant can be tolerant. Tolerance is the 
rational decision of a coercive power to limit its coercive func-
tion and not to abuse its own power. From the viewpoint of 
power, tolerance is the self-imposed limitation of the right to 
intervene. Note that genuine power, power that has a broad 
basis of legitimization, is generally much more tolerant than 
arbitrary, illegitimate power imposed by its own authority. 
Dictatorships are intolerant because they feel threatened 
by the variety of their subjects. All variegated, colorful life 
threatens compulsive uniformity. Legislative inflexibility and 
a surfeit of regulations are symptoms of a weak organism with 
a limited “range of tolerance”. Strong systems, by contrast, 
afford themselves a much more generous margin of permis-
siveness. Tolerance is thus the expression of a strong political 
organism, a guarantee of the health of the social body. Laxity, 
the abandonment of standards, anarchy, value confusion, 
feeble institutions, and disintegrating relativism are not signs 
of increased tolerance, however, but symptoms of degenera-
tion. Genuine tolerance is the antipode of weakness. One 
cannot be tolerant on behalf of a colorless facelessness, one 
cannot permit otherness when one has no identity oneself. 
One cannot permit everything simply because one does not 
believe in anything.
In brief, one cannot efficiently serve pluralism by resort-
ing to an anemic facelessness. Tolerance is the attention that 
the majority grants to each minority, the understanding that 
the strong show for the weak, and the wisdom of the norm 
not to enforce itself by power and coercion. In a world where 
the principle of equality had won final victory, the ethic of 
tolerance would be obsolete, just as it would be in a world 
of universally accepted freedom of religion. Tolerance is the 
virtue of the stronger party in living together with a counter-
part that is disadvantaged in one way or another. Without this 
structural separation, there can be no real tolerance, but only 
a kindhearted exchange of politenesses. It is a sign of a certain 
social pathology when a minority declares itself “tolerant” 
of a majority, when the exception tolerates the rule. As if the 
rabbit would declare itself tolerant of the elephant.
3. From the viewpoint of society, tolerance is the accept-
able solution of a disagreement. I choose non-discriminatory 
behavior in relation to a situation that I could oppose with 
arguments. Mere agreement with the other cannot be termed 
tolerance; it is merely a form of consensus. The word “toler-
ance” is used accurately and fittingly only if the tolerated ob-
ject retains a negative connotation. For instance, the expres-
sion “I am tolerant toward beautiful women” is absurd, unless 
it comes from a misogynist for whom beautiful women is a 
damnable category. You cannot be tolerant toward an idea 
or fact that you affirm and accept unconditionally. You can-
not tolerate what you are in complete harmony with. There 
must be a mental reservation, a difference of opinion, a de-
termination of critical difference between the one tolerating 
and the tolerated object. Tolerance is the tendency — or the 
decision  — to accept things that, by your own criteria, would 
be defined as unacceptable. Tolerance is shaking hands with 
what actually disconcerts and even exasperates.
All of these remArks lead to the conclusion that toler-
ance is a suitable and advisable behavior, but only because 
the world is imperfect. Tolerance has its place primarily in 
the environment of differences that are difficult to resolve, 
of political and social inequalities, of tension between good 
and evil. Tolerance demands that discernment show flex-
ibility and that judgment refrain from imposing penalties. Not 
excluding that which does not include oneself; allowing the 
other to be different and even, within limits, to err; accom-
modating the unsystematizable diversity of opinions, convic-
tions, and customs; not replacing conviction with coercion 
and extortion — these are the demands of tolerance, this is 
its virtue in the unfortunately impure ambience of everyday 
public life. In Paradise, tolerance has neither sense nor value. 
It is a transitory virtue, a transitional maneuver adapted to 
the promiscuity of the world. Under the conditions of an 
existence marked by traps, temptations, and provocations, 
tolerance aims in a way to rescue the decency of humanity. In 
an ideal world, tolerance would be unnecessary — a world in 
which evil was tamed, power equally distributed, and differ-
ences harmonized. Until the improbable moment when this 
comes to pass, we are, so to speak, condemned to tolerance. 
We must cultivate tolerance lucidly, level-headedly, and with-
out idolatry, and we must keep a watchful eye on the latent 
pathology of its functioning. For tolerance can certainly have 
murky abysses, suspicious motivations, and deforming ef-
fects. Let us look more closely at some of these aspects. There 
are forms of tolerance that, despite attractive packaging, 
contain a poisonous core. For example, there is the tolerance 
born of ambition. From the perspective of an exaggerated 
self-assessment, tolerance becomes a form of condescension 
and patronization, the arrogant marginalization of the toler-
ated object: I move on such lofty heights that I don’t deign 
even to perceive difference. I refuse to lower myself to deal 
with everything that contradicts me or disturbs my serenity.
Under certain circumstances, arrogance decides to behave 
tolerantly out of a kind of strategic consideration: I tolerate 
in order to defuse, I swallow and assimilate what resists me, 
and I thereby integrate resistance in the system, in the over-
powering image of the system. In the 1966 anthology A Cri-
tique of Pure Tolerance, Herbert Marcuse defined this kind of 
tolerance as a “mechanism of integration” and classified it as 
“repressive tolerance”. But condescending tolerance is not 
the only blameworthy form; there is also tolerance “from be-
low” — tolerance as the expression of submissive humility, as 
enduring an offense, or as a sign of weak character or convic-
tions. One can also be “tolerant” out of opportunism or pure 
indifference. The atheist who declares himself “tolerant” in 
religious questions is a fraud: in reality, the whole field of the 
religious is indifferent to him, so that “tolerance” costs him 
nothing.
A lax practice of tolerance and the demagogic exaggeration 
of tolerance bring with them the risk of anarchic develop-
ments. Karl Popper rightly remarked in his book The Open 
Society and Its Enemies that “unlimited tolerance leads to 
the disappearance of tolerance”. In other words, we have to 
reserve “the right not to tolerate the intolerant”. Popper’s 
wording is extremely circumspect. He speaks of the intoler-
ant person, but seems unconcerned with the category of the 
unacceptable, the intolerable. But tolerance is dangerous 
precisely when it minimizes, evades, or simply negates the 
problem of the intolerable.
whAt cAn we sAy about this problem? Are there objective 
limits to tolerance? In the applied sciences, things are simple 
and revealingly obvious and clear. Technicians use the term 
“range of tolerance” to indicate the limits within which cer-
tain deviations are allowed without impairing a given whole. 
The range of tolerance designates the degree of precision 
with which a component must be produced, for example. Ma-
chines can “tolerate” a certain approximation in the diameter 
of a pipe or the weight of a coin, but there is a limit beyond 
which the piece is rejected. The same is true of the human 
body: up to a certain limit, it can withstand physical pain or 
toxic substances, but beyond this limit, the physiological bal-
ance collapses. No system, whether mechanical or biological, 
can survive conditions that exceed its range of tolerance. No 
whole can tolerate principles or situations that undermine its 
raison d’être. For example, a judicious constitution cannot 
contain an article giving every citizen the right to violate the 
constitution.
Another illustration of the intolerable is error. The decision 
to show “understanding” for someone who maintains that 
two and two equal five cannot be regarded as tolerance. Tol-
erance is equally inappropriate in the legal system. One can-
not plead, in the name of tolerance, not to penalize a proven 
crime. Reduced sentences, pardons and amnesty operate on 
completely different principles, and are on a completely dif-
ferent semantic level from tolerance.
In child-raising, too, unlimited tolerance is not a particular-
ly auspicious solution. Of course, brutal methods and narrow-
minded didacticism without any understanding or patience 
are out of the question. But the theory of “identification” with 
the person one wants to bring up, the tendency to find a justi-
fying and excusing diagnosis for all his inadequacies inhibits 
and blocks the modeling impulse. Quite simply, you cannot 
bring up a child whom you “understand completely” by pro-
grammatically putting yourself “in his place”. The place of 
the pedagogue must be unmistakably delimited from that of 
the pupil, even if the pedagogue also has something to learn 
while he teaches.
As the topic of tolerance became more and more “politi-
cally correct” and fashionable in the wake of postmodern 
relativism, its contours began to blur. At the beginning of the 
1980s, the “paradox of tolerance” began to be mentioned 
with increasing frequency. The paradox arose, first, from the 
question, “How should the tolerant spirit respond to intoler-
ance?”, and second, from the difficulty of finding a precise 
argumentation for the claim that “it is good to tolerate what 
is not good”. But to what extent is the tolerant spirit obliged 
to behave permissively toward the intolerant person and the 
intolerable? And how can acceptance of the unacceptable 
be rationally justified? Isn’t the fact that you declare yourself 
tolerant an insult — as Goethe said — to the thing tolerated? 
Should tolerance develop towards an encouraging agree-
ment, toward esteem and respect? Shouldn’t the exception 
“ You know ThaT 
someThIng Is 
goIng on ThaT 
Is agaInsT The 
rules, You don’T 
aPProve of IT, buT 
You overlook IT.”
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finally be regarded, not as a transgression of the norm, but 
rather as a norm-shaping transgression? Starting from this 
kind of question, a tolerated reality begins gradually expand-
ing and striving for legitimacy by questioning the legitimacy 
of the tolerating authority. In other words, the exception 
becomes tolerant of the rule, and the rule takes on a guilty 
attitude, even an inferiority complex, toward the exception. 
The exception becomes militant and self-satisfied, almost dis-
criminatory and intolerant.
All this confusion is the result of the way we define and 
relate to “difference”. We have noted that tolerance can exist 
only where there is difference. The difference wants to be ac-
cepted and have a right to its identity; it wants validity, which 
would be normal in a pluralistic world that is prepared to give 
difference its due.
BUt the mAtter is much trickier than it appears at first 
glance. For difference, on the one hand, wants to be recog-
nized and confirmed as difference, while at the same time it 
strives for a status of non-difference, integrated, along with all 
other differences, in normality. What is tolerated as different 
does not always want to be considered different, a specimen 
of a peculiar category. Consequently, it does not like to be 
treated differently from others (even if this difference is posi-
tive, a surplus of benevolence). Its discourse has two compo-
nents that, in a way, contradict each other: (A) Respect me as 
I am, no matter how much I differ from you. Let me be differ-
ent! (B) I am basically your equal and don’t want the status 
of a tolerated exception. The difference that separates us is 
incidental when we consider the humanity that unites us. So 
don’t constantly remind me that I am different! Accordingly: 
(A) Accept and bear responsibility for the difference, and 
(B) behave as if the difference did not exist. To unite the two 
demands (A) and (B) in a single, coherent mode of behavior, 
a great deal of social benevolence, psychological sensitivity, 
and metaphysical perspicacity is required. If one emphasizes 
the difference, one will be suspected of a latent discrimina-
tory spirit. If one emphasizes equality, one will be suspected 
of minimizing the difference. Whatever one does, one is 
caught in a vicious circle that provokes general disapproval. 
One takes precautionary measures, but these can turn into as 
many mistakes. It resembles the cases of “sexism” that I my-
self experienced at several universities in the United States: If 
you let a woman into a building before you, you are labeled a 
“macho”; if you don’t, you have no manners.
Another example is the development of a disadvantaged 
community’s relations with a privileged community. In the 
first years after the fall of the communist regime in Romania, 
numerous donations arrived in the country for handicapped 
children. It proved extremely difficult to explain to healthy, 
but equally impoverished children in nearby children’s 
homes why the wonderful presents from abroad did not 
come their way too — especially because the healthy institu-
tionalized children, in their childish innocence, did not see a 
big difference between themselves and the others.
The contemporary tribulations of tolerance make it hard to 
discern who tolerates whom; one no longer knows who is the 
victim of whom. The one tolerated yesterday becomes today’s 
tolerant one, or invents a new kind of intolerance. The fear of 
making a mistake leads to complicated forms of self-censor-
ship, to baroque forms of hypocrisy, and to unprecedented 
social anxieties. The problem of tolerance is developing un-
imagined and unexpected nuances. A passionate discussion 
of this theme can be found in Thomas Nagel’s Mortal Ques-
tions (1979). The author notes that the fear of slipping into a 
condemnable negative discrimination gives rise to a natural 
tendency to practice a positive discrimination. Among equally 
qualified candidates for a particular position, the choice is 
generally for the disadvantaged, black, or female candidate. 
The question now arises whether this decision is just or not. 
Nagel’s opinion is that this is a just decision whose goal is to 
correct an earlier, “traditional”, clearly unjust system.
Yet positive discrimination taken to its extreme points up 
the problem of the right relationship between equality and 
freedom. The need for equality ends in a crisis of the need for 
free competition and free choice. Also, how far can the rule 
of positive discrimination go? Nowadays, racist and sexist 
injustice are minimal and under control in the civilized coun-
tries. But new dilemmas and new predicaments can appear 
on the horizon at any time. Perhaps we would spontaneously 
prefer the better looking of two equal candidates for the same 
TV position and, to avoid negative discrimination, would 
rationally have to choose the one who is not so good-looking. 
We would have to take care not to advantage the slender over 
the fat, the blonde over the dark-haired, and the tall over 
the short. But what should we do when we have to choose 
between an intelligent candidate and one who is not so intel-
ligent? Or between a talented and an untalented actor? One 
could assume that, in our perfidious way, we would tend to 
prefer intelligence and talent. But shouldn’t we have scruples 
and ask ourselves why the less intelligent and less talented 
should be blamed for being the way they are? Shouldn’t we 
prefer them, thus correcting the injustice done them at birth? 
Nagel concedes that proceeding further in this direction leads 
to the boundary of moral utopianism. We will never find the 
perfect dosage of regulative constraint that does not hinder 
individual freedom or the right to make a decision by person-
al criteria and in harmony with a way of living and working 
that is not, in Habermas’s words, “colonized” by an abstract 
jurisprudence. 
we Are moving on UncertAin, dangerous terrain paved 
with prejudices, vulnerabilities, and mistrust. Every radical-
ism can lead to suffering, but every permissive frivolity can 
lead to confusion and disorder. We simply have no solutions. 
So let’s not act as if we had. All we can say is that the reasons 
for our tolerance are more numerous and weighty than the 
arguments for intolerance. We can be tolerant in the name 
of reason and decide that every individual has the right to 
his own opinion and that this principle of law is the original 
rationality of our specific structure. But we can also be toler-
ant in the name of the uncertainty of our shaky reason and 
decide that we have no access to universal truth and thus no 
access to absolute certainty, and that, consequently, we can-
not claim to be right all the time. We can believe the Stoics 
that man stands above truth and that it would thus be unwise 
to limit him geometrically with abstract judgments. Or we can 
be relativists like John Milton (Areopagitica, a Speech for the 
Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, 1644) and note that, on an im-
manent level, there is no chemically pure evil or chemically 
pure good and that we thus lack criteria for categorical and 
radical distancing and separation (“In moral evil much good 
can be mixed”). We can say with John Stuart Mill that toler-
ance is the necessary derivative of freedom, or claim with 
John Rawls that it is the logical correlate of equality.
An extremely important and far too little noted source 
of tolerance is humor. To view the spectacle of the world 
without doggedness, to be able to enjoy the colorful charm 
of the real, to be able to distinguish between the very few 
things that must be taken seriously and the numerous things 
that need not be taken so seriously, and above all not to take 
oneself too seriously, with all one’s pompous opinions, pre-
fabricated certainties, and more or less hypocritical claims 
and demands — all of this together would certainly be a very 
thorough motivation for a spirit of tolerance.
A stimUlAting BAckgroUnd for tolerance, along with 
humor, is genuine faith or — to use a more encompassing 
term — the sense of transcendence. Intolerance is the opposite: 
an exaggeration of immanence, a kind of short-sightedness 
that monumentalizes differences perceived in the undeter-
mined development of the horizontal and that is unable to 
gain elevation to view things from the vantage point of a calm 
timelessness, rather than from the perspective of clamorous 
everyday life. Tolerance imitates or anticipates the sover-
eign justice of God, “for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil 
and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the 
unjust” (Matthew 5:45). Divine “justice” is termed anoché in 
the Greek text. The prefix aná indicates the rising direction. 
Tolerance is the aura of one who rises above differences. 
Anoché also means reserve, tranquility and calm, the suspen-
sion of judgment, the tendency to cease fire, giving the other 
a chance. When I think about it, the biblical terminology of 
tolerance — whether anoché, hypomonè (see Luke 8:15; 1st 
Corinthians 13:7), makrothymia (which in the Old Testament 
designates God’s ability to dominate His wrath at human 
sins), or the Latin derivations (patientia, sustinentia, sufferen-
tia) adopted in the works of the Church Fathers — leaves little 
space for innovation by later speculations. Modern tolerance 
is the worldly version of an ascetic virtue: patience, the abil-
ity to avoid prematurely classifying unclassifiable people 
and uncomfortable situations, the ability to understandingly 
endure difference, hindrance, and hostility, and the refusal 
to institute oneself as a judging authority. Avva Theodotos, 
a rather obscure monk in fourth-century Egypt, summed 
up the entire spectrum of tolerance (which presupposes the 
identification and acceptance of deviation from the norm) in 
the laconic sentence: “He who said ‘Thou shalt not commit 
adultery’ also said ‘Thou shalt not judge others’.”
How Christianity, with such a heritage, could itself become 
intolerant and why some manifestations of Islam, 
whose body of texts on tolerance is even more 
extensive than the Christian one, became fanati-
cal and merciless — that is another story. To tell it 
here and now would go beyond your toler-
ance. ≈
Note: This lecture was delivered at 
the Romanian Institute of Culture, 
Stockholm, in May 2012.
“ The need for 
equalITY ends 
In a crIsIs of The 
need for free 
comPeTITIon and 
free choIce.”